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“Bad Company – Militias as Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns” 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From ancient Carthage to colonial Banda Aceh to contemporary Kabul, counterinsurgency 
(COIN) campaigns have been frequently conducted in foreign lands, with a small force facing 
off against a numerically superior enemy and a predominantly hostile population. While their 
political context and military technology may have changed over the centuries, the challenges 
to the counterinsurgent have remained remarkably similar (Hughes 2016). To combat these 
issues, counterinsurgents have used indigenous Forces (IF) as a vital component of out-of-
territory COIN campaigns. 
While using IF may have a long-standing tradition among military practitioners, results 
have varied widely. Although several problems with the use of IF have been identified, the 
academic research suffers both from a lack of structure, and a peculiar blindness towards the 
influence of armed groups’ own strategic behavior on their performance as IF, and on the 
strategic levels of COIN. This gap in the literature becomes even more glaring considering 
that some of the most prominent conflicts of the 21
st
 century are COIN campaigns, including 
Iraq and Afghanistan (cf. Gentile 2012). 
In order to investigate what makes an IF deployment successful, this study addresses 
this gap, and examines how the strategies of different militias impact on their utility as IF in 
COIN campaigns. 
Based on the study of warlords’ COIN performance conducted in Ikas (2015), strategic 
profiles of two subtypes of militias used as IF are constructed and contrasted with the 
purported benefits of using IF within COIN. Anecdotal evidence of these subtypes and their 
utility in COIN is offered to illustrate this theoretical comparison.  
The conclusions find that the strategic goal of traditional militias, while offering 
substantial tactical and operational benefits, collide with the fundamental strategy behind 
COIN. On the other hand, self-defense militias are found to be materially weak, but 
strategically compatible, guarantors of local security. These findings are then used to generate 
a set of policy recommendations on how militias may best be integrated into COIN campaigns 
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The study begins by introducing its methods and operationalizing key terms used in the 
analysis. Following this, the existing literature on COIN, IF and violent non-state actors is 
reviewed and fit into a strategic model. Building on the literature, behavioral patterns of two 
distinct militia subtypes are constructed and cast into the same three-leveled strategic 
framework. These profiles are tested against the theoretical predictions from the IF literature 
to examine their respective benefits in COIN campaigns. The study offers several policy 
recommendations on when and how to integrate different types of IF, before it concludes with 
some summary remarks. 
 
2. Methodology & Key terms 
 
This study’s research goal is to provide an explorative theoretical framework on militias 
as IF, therefore its core method is a literature review of the most authoritative academic 
literature on the subject. This theoretical framework combines the research on IF, militias and 
VNSA into a comprehensive model of the strategic behavior of militias, which is then used to 
determine their suitability as IF. Although limitations of space do not allow for in-depth case 
studies, anecdotal empirical examples will be used to illustrate the argument. 
In order to accentuate the nuances in militias’ behavior and make them relatable to the 
study of COIN, the literature on IF and militias will be reviewed in terms of the three levels of 
military strategy and a group’s overall aim: the “ultimate political objective” (Duyvesteyn & 
Fumerton 2010: 28) or goal a group pursues, and the overarching strategy, understood as the 
development of “security objectives and guidance” and the deployment of “resources” (DOD 
2016: 227) of war, through which this goal is achieved. On the second, operational level a 
string of military engagements “are planned, conducted and sustained to achieve strategic 
objectives” (DOD 2016: 176). Finally, the tactical level covers “the conduct of battle” (Van 
Creveld 1991: 96) where specific maneuvers are “executed to achieve military objectives” 
(DOD 2016: 234). 
For the purposes of this study, ‘insurgency’ refers to the strategy of an armed group “to 
gain political-military control of a population and its territory” (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton 
2010: 28) through the tactical and operational use of guerrilla warfare and the provision of 
“rival governance” (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton 2010: 33). 
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Following Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi (2009), this study focuses on COIN 
campaigns outside of the counterinsurgent’s home territory. This caveat is necessary to 
distinguish between the ‘indigenous forces’ and the foreign ‘counterinsurgent’, the latter of 
which refers exclusively to an external state actor actively participating in a conflict against 
insurgents. 
Finally, ‘indigenous forces’ in this study refers exclusively to armed formations that 
have been coopted or sponsored by the counterinsurgent, but not created, as the latter are 
unlikely to exhibit the same degree of local connectedness. Groups that have been founded by 
the counterinsurgent before or during the conflict, such as the British ‘Presidency Armies’ in 
colonial India, are thereby excluded from the analysis. 
 
3. Counterinsurgency – Strategy, Operations & Tactics  
 
 ‘Counterinsurgency’ is a subtype of asymmetrical war that has as its ‘ultimate political goal’ 
the military and political marginalization of an insurgency (Kilcullen 2009: 110-113). Modern 
COIN strategies include the “population-centric (…) ‘hearts and minds’ (Kilcullen 2009: 111) 
approach, which aims to “seize control of the (local) population in order to isolate and 
overpower the insurgents” (Plakoudas 2015: 133), as well as the more coercive “enemy-
centric approach [prioritizing] the extermination of the insurgents” (Plakoudas 2015: 132). 
In contrast, the more prominent population-centric ‘hearts and minds’ strategy of 
modern COIN examined here emphasizes the establishment of “[l]ocal government 
effectiveness, presence, and local partnerships” (Kilcullen 2009: 113) and has “at its heart 
(…) nation-building” (Gentile 2012: 378; cf. Kitzen 2012: 94). Most importantly, it relies on 
the “use of selective violence” (Souleimanov & Aliyev 2016: 409, emphasis added). Thus, 
through the centuries the strategy of COIN has been modified from colonial subjugation to 
external state-building, for which local legitimacy and IF play a pivotal part (Gentile 2012). 
Operationally, modern COIN campaigns follow the established pattern of “clear-hold-
build” (Ucko 2013: 54), with counterinsurgents advancing like “ink spots spreading across 
blotting paper” (ibid.). Counterinsurgent forces “first clear areas from insurgent control, then 
hold them securely to prevent insurgents from returning, which in turn allows for the build 
phase, in which civilians and military forces engage in development (…) to assist the local 
population” (ibid.). Within that pattern, counterinsurgents need to plan and undertake 
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operations to gather and evaluate intelligence, fortify their positions, pursue and kill the 
insurgents, and build up local capacities and institutions to win over the population (Kilcullen 
2009: 112-113). 
On a tactical level, “strike operations” (Department of the Army 2007: 89), where 
“[s]mall, highly mobile combat forces (…) locate and fix the insurgents” (ibid.), are mixed 
with sweeps of villages and cities, patrols among the population, and the safeguarding of 
military and civilian targets of interest (Department of the Army 2007; Ucko 2013). There are 
myriads of alterations and specifics to each of these tactical maneuvers, but at the core they 
are all “connected with operational and strategic military objectives” (Plakoudas 2015: 139). 
 
4. Indigenous Forces – The State of Research 
 
The benefits of employing IF in counterinsurgency campaigns, as explored by the IF 
literature, can be summarized under three major headings: 
Concerning their military capabilities, Robert Cassidy, Yoav Gortzak, and Hughes all 
note the additional “manpower” (Gortzak 2009: 307) and an increase in the ability to 
“eliminate insurgent leadership, cadre and combatants” (Cassidy 2006: 48; Hughes 2016). 
Since conducting a COIN campaign is “labour-intensive (…) the recruitment of auxiliaries is 
often essential to enable an overstretched army and police to focus on (…) insurgents” 
(Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 11). Furthermore, lightly-armed, mobile units of IF can “match the 
enemy’s special skills in irregular warfare” (Cassidy 2007: 45) better than traditional military 
forces (cf. Andres et al 2006: 135). 
Hughes adds that IF offer “a more discriminate and precise means of locating and 
neutralizing small guerrilla groups than [with] conventional combat tactics” (Hughes 2016: 
203). In his quantitative study on sweep operations conducted by the Russian military in 
Chechnya, Jason Lyall finds that Chechen units were more effective, in terms of preventing 
new insurgent attacks after sweeps, than their Russian counterparts (Lyall 2010). Lyall also 
notes that ‘coethnics’ “shift the interaction (…) from a one-time event to a (threatened) 
repeated one” (Lyall 2010: 16), and could therefore issue more credible threats to the 
population. 
This local knowledge is also acknowledged as being vital in supplying information on 
important actors, geographical specifics and local customs to the counterinsurgents (Cassidy 
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2006; Hughes 2016). In contrast to the counterinsurgent, IF possess “better knowledge of the 
physical and human terrain (…) especially if they’re employed in their own territory or 
neighbourhoods” (Hughes 2016: 203). Through the use of “trackers, interpreters, agents and 
informants” (Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 6) this knowledge is transformed into actionable 
intelligence. Consequently, the “identification problem” (Kalyvas 2006: 89) of spotting 
insurgents within the population that arises in any irregular war can be tackled more 
effectively (Clayton & Thomson 2014: 922; Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 7). Western forces in 
Afghanistan made extensive use of IF “[b]ased (…) on the belief that Afghans would be better 
than Americans at distinguishing enemies from noncombatants” (Andres et al 2006: 150). 
Finally, the inclusion of IF can enhance the legitimacy and ‘soft power’ of the 
counterinsurgent. According to Emil Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, IF can help to shift the 
“socio-cultural (…) asymmetry of values” (Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015: 679) between 
counterinsurgents and the population by grounding their presence within the local context, 
bettering their chances of establishing popularly accepted state structures (cf. Andres et al 
2006: 156). IF therefore act as “a symbol of the legitimacy of the (…) counterinsurgency 
efforts” (Scheipers 2015: 126). 
By recruiting former insurgents into IF units, Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi 
stress, counterinsurgents can also “provide a possible route for conflict termination and 
reconciliation” (Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 3) while weakening the insurgency (Hughes & 
Tripodi 2009: 4-5). Thus, rather than being a mere tactical military instrument, including IF 
can “increase the strategic utility of armed force” (Andres et al 2006: 155). 
Similarly, Govinda Clayton and Andrew Thomson argue that including more social 
groups on the counterinsurgent’s side “shifts the primary targets of insurgent violence (…) 
from the incumbent state forces and onto local civilians” (Clayton & Thomson 2014: 923). 
This forces insurgents to actively fight the same population they themselves depend on and, 
crucially, “creat[es] opportunities for insurgents to engage in indiscriminate violence (…) 
against communities which join” (Peic 2014: 167) the COIN side. Indiscriminate violence, on 
the other hand, can lead to a strengthening of resistance by the population, an erosion of the 
perceived legitimacy of the insurgents, and a stronger incentive to ally with the 
counterinsurgent (Clayton & Thomson 2014; Kalyvas 2006: 151-159). 
The literature also mentions some fundamental problems of using IF, such as their 
dubious military effectiveness. Speaking of the armed groups employed by states in 
contemporary civil wars, John Mueller speaks of “hooligans (…) small bands of criminals and 
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violent opportunists (…) [who] lack organization, discipline, broad popular support, or 
ideological commitment” (Mueller 2003: 508-510; cf. Van Creveld 1991: 225). Far from 
being an effective fighting force, these “drunken thugs have been successful mainly because 
they are the biggest bullies on the block” (ibid.) and are inherently unfit for engaging actual 
insurgents. Mueller presents the paramilitary forces sponsored by the states of former 
Yugoslav states as a prime example (ibid.). Similarly, Andres et al cite pundits’ disdain over 
the subpar “tactical qualities of the [indigenous] screening forces” (Andres et al 2006: 144) 
and their waning morale (ibid.).  
As Anthony Vinci adds, the general inclination towards “attack[ing] civilians rather than 
military targets” (Vinci 2007: 324) characteristic of such irregular formations applies to a 
variety of VNSA, including tribal and self-defense militias (Berkeley 2001: 15; Schuberth 
2015). Recalling the conflict in Liberia, Berkeley notes that “militias rarely confronted each 
other head-on; instead they preyed on civilians” (Berkeley 2001: 54). Similarly, Schuberth 
confirms that eventually, militias focused on civilian targets “in virtually every case” 
(Schuberth 2015: 312).  
 Another issue is that an “information asymmetry” (Byman 2006: 89) in favor of local 
agents makes counterinsurgents highly dependent on their IF. Local actors might use this to 
deliberately misinform counterinsurgents by wrongly denouncing their rivals as insurgents to 
further their own personal agendas, as routinely happened during feuds of Afghan warlords 
(Kalyvas 2006: 14; Hughes 2016: 206). 
Relying on the support of IF also effectively prevents counterinsurgents from 
sanctioning local actors (Kitzen 2012: 108). Through the subsequent “moral hazard” (Byman 
2006: 81) dilemma, empowered local allies may act especially recklessly and without the 
counterinsurgent’s consent because they feel emboldened by the extensive support they 
receive, exacerbating the conflict situation even further in the process. 
Furthermore, as both Hughes and Tripodi and Kalyvas note, “the use of surrogates from 
one particular social group (…) can exacerbate internal tensions and encourage civil war” 
(Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 25), by “driv[ing] a wedge within the native population” (Kalyvas 
2006: 171). 
Vanda Felbab-Brown reports detrimental effects of Afghan Local Police units sponsored 
by Western counterinsurgents, as they “have a strong tendency to escape control by their 
overseers and engage in problematic and abusive behavior (…) [thus becoming] a new driver 
of conflict themselves” (Felbab-Brown 2016: 259). The boost in support such actors receive 
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can also create powerful incentives for them to actively prolong the conflict in order to secure 
their elevated position, as warlords tend to do (Vinci 2007; Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 13-14). 
 
5.  Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency – A Strategic Model 
 
Following Ikas (2015), the findings of the IF literature can now be related to the three 
strategic levels of COIN: 
On a tactical level, IF bolster counterinsurgents’ capacity to execute their maneuvers 
and to “eliminate [the] insurgent leadership, cadre and combatants” (Cassidy 2006: 48) 
threefold: First, by “providing a significant increase in the quantity of troops on the ground” 
(ibid.) the tactical raids, sweeps and patrols executed by the counterinsurgents’ forces are 
facilitated (Peic 2014; cf. Hughes 2016). Second, IF’s comparatively loose organizational 
structure allows mobile, “light indigenous troops” (Andres et al 2006: 127) to “match the 
enemy’s special skills in irregular warfare” (Cassidy 2007: 45; cf. Gentile 2012: 381; 
Scheipers 2015: 126). This enables IF to pursue insurgents in locations where 
counterinsurgent troops could not due to physical or cultural limitations, such as through 
pathless terrain or sites considered taboo for outsiders (cf. Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015, 
2016). Third, through their superior knowledge of the language and ‘human terrain’ on the 
ground, including organizational structures and tactics of the insurgents, IF can provide 
tactical input on the battlefield itself as well as on physical or cultural obstacles (Cassidy 
2007: 45; Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 6-7). 
That being said, the military ineptitude of IF puts into question these ostensible 
advantages, as they desert when faced with dogged resistance (Mueller 2003), engage in 
predatory behavior (Felbab-Brown 2015) or cooperate with insurgents, warning them of 
impeding raids (Kitzen 2012: 108; Souleimanov & Aliyev 2016: 406-408). 
Operationally, the actionable intelligence gained by IF benefits ‘clear-hold-build’ 
twofold: First, IF provide an overview of geographical, social and cultural specifics of a 
particular theatre of operations beyond immediate battlefields, thus helping to identify 
insurgent strongholds, pathways and feasible targets for the operational planning process 
(Lyall 2010; Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015, 2016). Second, by boosting counterinsurgents’ 
physical presence in the community the potential for retaliatory attacks against captured sites 
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and friendly collaborators is reduced, while cooperation with insurgents can be punished more 
effectively (Byman 2006: 91-92; cf. Kalyvas 2006: 173-181). 
However, the unreliability of IF can also impact the COIN on an operational level, as 
vital mission intelligence is passed on to the insurgency and faulty intelligence passed on to 
the counterinsurgents, deliberately or accidentally. Especially where the vetting process for 
recruits is rushed along to quickly increase their numbers, a distinct threat of large-scale 
subversion by insurgents also materializes (Felbab-Brown 2016: 268; cf. Roggio & Lundquist 
2016). In addition, the quality and quantity of the intelligence passed on decreases the farther 
away from an indigenous unit’s home territory an operation takes place (Schuberth 2015: 299; 
Kitzen 2012: 108-109). 
Finally, employing IF also directly contributes to the strategy of the COIN in four ways: 
First, by including actors perceived as more legitimately by the population, the COIN 
campaign and the institutions it establishes engender additional support (Gentile 2012: 383; 
Scheipers 2015: 126). Second, sponsoring IF units opens up a venue for the demobilization 
and reintegration of former insurgents, thereby further weakening the insurgency while 
strengthening the numbers and legitimacy of the COIN (Byman 2006: 98; Hughes & Tripodi 
2009). Third, IF themselves can act as a building block for the security and government 
structures the COIN seeks to establish (Felbab-Brown 2016: 262-63; Scheipers 2015). Fourth, 
by including more societal groups on the COIN side, insurgents are forced to fight the 
population they have to win over in order to survive which also “distance[s] the civilian 
population politically from the rebel[s]” (Peic 2014: 167, emphasis added; Clayton & 
Thomson 2014). 
The envisioned legitimacy for the COIN campaign is undermined, however, if the IF 
alienate the population through abuses of power, which can result in even less acceptance for 
the counterinsurgents’ narrative and a revitalization of the insurgency (Felbab-Brown 2016; 
Jones 2012: 8-10; Kalyvas 2006: 108). Furthermore, using IF as a demobilization and 
reintegration program risks legalizing predatory entities as official government 
representatives, and allowing insurgents to infiltrate the COIN (Felbab-Brown 2016: 265-66; 
Souleimanov & Aliyev 2016). 
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6. Militias as Violent Non-State Actors 
 
Ranging from comprehensive typologies focused on distinguishing subtypes (Shultz et al 
2004; Schuberth 2015) to in-depth characterizations of specific actors, such as terrorists, 
insurgents and warlords (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton 2010; Marten 2009), the literature is rich 
with classifications of VNSA and empirical applications (Peic 2014; Thurber 2014).  
The typology of Moritz Schuberth (2015) distinguishes itself by constructing important 
scope conditions for a subset of VNSA relevant for this study, namely “community-based 
armed groups (CBAGs)” (Schuberth 2015: 296). CBAGs are characterized by an “eponymous 
embeddedness [sic] within the community in which they emerge” (Schuberth 2015: 299). 
Juxtaposing politically motivated insurgents and terrorists who actively engage in a struggle 
against the state, CBAGs’ “aims are parochial in nature and limited to the ambitions of local 
strongmen” (Schuberth 2015: 298). Instead of operating ubiquitously as terrorists or 
insurgents do, these “boundaries of the community (…) limit the reach of CBAGs” 
(Schuberth 2015: 299). 
CBAGs fulfill clear functions within their communities and are classified based on a 
“predominant dimension – either security, political, or economic (…) [which] correspond 
with (…) different ideal types” (Schuberth 2015: 300-301): Vigilante groups, ethnic or 
popular militias, and criminal gangs. 
While Schubert’s argument lacks parsimony and a clear link to IF, his basic three-tiered 
classification system will serve as a point of departure for this study. Since further definitional 
demarcation is necessary to achieve analytical clarity on this topic, this study will specifically 
focus on two of Schuberth’s categories, which are also the most prevalent types of militias: 
traditional and self-defense militias. 
In order to define specific militias along multiple “continuum[s]” (Alden et al 2011: 25) 
of constitutive characteristics, the study by Chris Alden et al proposes a four-layered 
analytical framework: Using a militia’s motivations, the strategies and tactics it uses, its 
organizational structure and their relations to other actors in their environment, they construct 
profiles of different empirical militias (ibid.). However, Alden at al (2011), limit themselves 
to single case studies, while missing the opportunity to establish general subtypes of militias. 
In contrast, the subtypes of militias constructed here aim to create abstract analytical 
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categories, focused on militias’ strategic, operational and tactical behavior rather than their 
organizational structures. 
Combining insights from Alden et al (2011) with elements from Hughes (2016) and 
Schuberth (2015) the short, if generic, definition of a ‘militia’ advanced here is ‘a community-
based armed group organized around a specific foundational goal, operating locally outside 
the state’s military without explicit political ambitions’. Similar to Schuberth (2015), the three 
foundational goals identified here, physical security, socio-cultural autonomy and economic 
gain, are also connected to specific ideal types: self-defense militias, traditional militias and 
warlord militias. As they have already been examined in Ikas (2015), warlord militias will not 
be covered separately in this study. 
 
6.1. Parochialism & Patronage – Traditional Militias 
 
Based broadly on the few academic accounts on them, a traditional militia can be defined as 
‘a community-based armed group based on traditional authority and extensive patronage, 
which recruits along predefined clan, tribal or ethnic networks’. Traditional militias use “their 
control over important resources in accordance with tribal law (…) to maintain local order 
with a fair amount of popular legitimacy” (Marten 2009: 165), thereby distinguishing 
themselves from the purely coercion and patronage-based rule of warlords (cf. Vinci 2007). 
On the other hand, traditional militias’ strategic goal of conserving the “sovereignty of [their] 
cultural-political identity” (Christian 2011: 3), which goes beyond physical security, and their 
broad “control over culture, language, protective forces [and] resources (ibid.) also distinguish 
them from temporary self-defense militias focused on immediate security provision (Shultz & 
Dew 2006: 52-53; Schuberth 2015). The structures underlying traditional militias, however, 
are far from unitary, as “authority is continuously in negotiation” (Christian 2011: 40) 
between different subgroups, and decision-making is constrained by traditional norms (cf. 
Guistozzi 2009: 12-14; Marten 2009: 165). Moreover, traditional militias also usually fulfill a 
range of other socio-cultural, legal, and economic functions, as evidenced by the extensive 
patronage networks established by the numerous Shia militias of Iraq (Thurber 2014; 
Christian 2011: 14). 
With regards to traditional militias’ tactics, Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew stress the 
importance of “traditional concepts of warfare” (Shultz & Dew 2006: 261), with Patrick 
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Christian corroborating that the “use of the social ordering for defense of the tribe and its 
territories has evolved (…) [into] systems of low-intensity warfare” (Christian 2011: 17).  
Although this means that the prominence of specific tactics necessarily varies between 
specific traditional militias, they generally involve “relatively small [units] (…) assembled for 
unconventional operations, most notably ambushes and hit-and-run strikes” (Shultz & Dew 
2006: 263). During these maneuvers, they can extract intelligence and resources by 
“capitaliz[ing] on the support, or at minimum acquiescence, of local populations” (Shultz & 
Dew 2006: 265). Shultz and Dew also note, however, that during the course of prolonged war 
“the strict customary codes that govern the use of force (…) are often modified and even 
superseded” (Shultz & Dew 2006: 268), leading traditional militias to adapt much more brutal 
tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), public executions, and the 
deliberate targeting of civilians (ibid.). In the case of Iraq, this gradual escalation of the 
severity of violence beyond traditional laws of war has been widely observed (Shultz & Dew 
2006: 199; Hughes 2010: 164-167). 
Extensive kinship networks are also essential to traditional militias’ operational 
capabilities through 
“[t]ribal information exchange systems (…) which tribes use to collect and disseminate 
enemy information, situational awareness regarding other tribes, and the presence of 
foreigners and the friendly order of battle, as well as an estimate of the situation and 
mission orders” (Christian 2011: 18) 
Their operations will aim to counter any armed challenger threatening their community 
militarily or politically, both by defending their own territory and by violently pushing for 
“political participation, economic power, social expansion and cultural hegemony” (Christian 
2011: 33; Shultz & Dew 2006: 92). Christian refers to this aggressive pursuit of hegemony as 
“[t]he tribal motivation behind the tribal action” (Christian 2011: 33), although Shultz and 
Dew stress that an active pursuit of larger hegemony requires a “political entrepreneur who 
mobilizes clan segments in order to pursue political objectives” (Shultz & Dew 2006: 92), 
leading the group more towards traditional-based insurgency, as exemplified by the Houthi 
insurgency in Yemen.  
Apart from strictly military operations, traditional militias may also engage in various 
economic activities to secure their socio-cultural unit. As Christian Tripodi points out, 
traditional militias’ “violence [is] not simply an expression of tribal identity (…) but more 
often than not a recognizably rational (…) reaction to basic political or socio-economic 
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predicaments” (Tripodi 2011: 594; cf. Thurber 2014). That being said, traditional militias rely 
first and foremost on the solidarity of their kin, extended by virtue of their established socio-
cultural networks (Christian 2011: 14). 
Finally, the overall strategy pursued by traditional militias to secure the sovereignty of 
their socio-cultural unit is twofold: Internally, cohesion between disparate subunits is being 
strengthened through the hostilities themselves, using “enemies to reinforce identity 
boundaries and dissociate (…) an opposing out-group” (Christian 2011: 13; 17). Externally, 
any attempt at centralizing politico-military, socio-economic or cultural power at the hands of 
rival entities, be they government forces, insurgents, or other militias, is resisted. As Shultz 
and Dew put it, the primacy tribal militias award to their kin “prevents a larger national unity, 
since the clan regards the interest of its members as paramount above all others” (Shultz & 
Dew 2006: 53; cf. Thurber 2014: 916). Even where attempts at reconciliation by the central 
authorities are offered, the “’ingroup-outgroup’ process of identity definition that the tribe 
employs with neighbouring tribes” (Christian 2011: 47) means that this intrinsic “motivation 
cannot be [fully] suppressed outside of genocide, [although] the action(s) can be moderated” 
(Christian 2011: 33).  
 
Two important caveats concerning traditional militias and the academic literature on them 
must be made. First, as the phenomenon of “interethnic defection” (Kalyvas 2004: 107) in 
civil war demonstrates, the supposedly rigid categories of belonging at the bottom of 
traditional militias may change during the course of a conflict (Kalyvas 2004; cf. De Vos 
1995: 17-26). Due to their explicit grounding in the local cultural context “impos[ing] a logic 
on a very chaotic subject, [when] reality is fluid” (Giustozzi 2009: 24) runs the risk of forging 
unjust generalizations. Far from proposing to crudely ‘lump together’ tribal formations in 
Western Pakistan with ethnicity-based militias in Rwanda and armed clans in Chechnya, the 
analytical category of traditional militias aims to abstract from these specific cases to 
highlight the unique resources armed actors embedded in traditionally grown legitimacy 
possess. Recalling the acknowledged importance of legitimacy in COIN, these groups warrant 
more attention by researchers, to which this study contributes. 
Second, in researching traditional societies and their militias, researchers must be wary 
of falling into the Orientalist patterns of argumentation some of the existing literature utilizes. 
By losing themselves in analytically dubious descriptions of “ferocious martial 
temperament[s]” (Shultz & Dew 2006: 43), and eternalized features of tribes that have 
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“evolved over thousands of generations in a Darwinian survival of the fittest” (Christian 2011: 
17), scholars may inadvertently essentialize and reduce these complex actors to outdated 
clichés. This includes romanticized notions of “freedom-loving warrior culture[s]” (Tripodi 
2011: 595) and the prominent analytical concept of immortal ‘tribal hatred’, which leads to 
the “objectification of the other, and to historicist constructions that obscure as they reveal 
their perspective” (Harrow 2005: 34). By constructing a specific model of warfare grounded 
in “tribal warfare concepts [of] – valor, courage, manly behavior, and military prowess” 
(Shultz & Dew 2006: 220), Keith Stanksi claims, scholars implicitly “substantiate 
assumptions about the superiority of Western modes of warfare” (Stanski 2009: 80), leading 
to faulty assumptions about actors’ behavior and policy recommendations marred by 
stereotypes. Shultz and Dew making an active case for reviving the ‘Martial Races’ theories 
of Imperial ethnographers of the 19
th
 century, which “[o]wing to its inherent racism (…) is 
wholly discredited today” (Scheipers 2015: 133), speaks volumes of the prevalence of this 
issue within the literature and its academic and ethical dangers (cf. Shultz & Dew 2006: 46-
48). 
 
6.2. Home is Where the War is – Self-Defense Militias 
 
Based on the existing research, self-defense militias are defined as community-based armed 
“associations in which citizens have joined together for self-protection (…) against external 
threats” (Schuberth 2015: 303). Since the ‘foundational goal’ of self-defense militias is 
“providing security, rather than pursuing their political or economic interests” (ibid.), the 
broad definition advocated here explicitly includes anti- and pro-government (Koos 2014: 
1042). While this is in contrast to some conceptualizations in the literature (cf. Clayton & 
Thomson 2014; Schuberth 2015), it is justified by this study’s focus on groups not created by 
a state party or counterinsurgent, as well as the group’s underlying function of protecting the 
community from any harm regardless of the perpetrator.  
In contrast to most VNSA, these formations are “primarily grassroots phenomena” 
(Blocq 2014: 710) built upon “[s]mall-scale communal settings (…) and strong interpersonal 
relationships” (Koos 2014: 1045). Ultimately, self-defense militias have to appeal to a “broad-
based (…) support base, [to receive] more resources (…) from the community” (Jentzsch 
2014: 40). If self-defense militias do contain elements of traditional legitimacy, it resembles 
warlords’ instrumentalization of it, insofar as they may mimic it to secure cohesion, but are 
- 14 - 
 
not actually a product of it or constrained by its rules (Giustozzi 2009: 12-14; cf. Ikas 2015: 
4). Furthermore, because of their dependency on local contributions, self-defense militias 
must be “strongly embedded within preexisting local social structures (…) [which] helps not 
only to mobilize (…) but also to control their operations and sanction misbehavior” (Koos 
2014: 1044). 
This reliance on the local community, and the scarcity of resources and recruits (cf. 
Koos 2014: 1047; Jentzsch 2014: 26), shows in self-defense militias’ tactics, which are 
generally confined to “patrolling, intelligence gathering, policing tasks (…) defense in the 
case of an attack (…) nightly patrols, systems to alert people (…) [and] the identification of 
protected spaces to flee” (Jentzsch 2014: 26, 29). That being said, some self-defense militias, 
such as the ‘Arrow Boys’ of South Sudan, have also engaged their tormentors by “track[ing] 
them and, if possible, attack[ing] them (…) by surprise” (Koos 2014: 1048), by actively using 
their “profound knowledge of (…) the [local] area” (ibid.). 
However, essentially self-defense militias “are not mobile fighting forces” (Clayton & 
Thomson 2014: 921), hence their operational focus rests on the defense of their respective 
community, which may range from a neighborhood to a village and several villages (Jentzsch 
2014: 28; cf. Koos 2014: 1047). As a consequence, for the most part self-defense militias’ 
“activities are closely tied to their locality” (Kalyvas 2006: 107; cf. Clayton & Thomson 
2014: 21). 
As is the case with traditional militias, the self-defense militias’ strategy has an internal 
and external component. Internally, self-defense militias “create innovative institutions” 
(Jentzsch 2014: 9), and attempt to “empower (…) the people” (Jentzsch 2014: 258) by 
“creat[ing] a belief in agency, which enable[s] (…) large-scale mobilization” (Jentzsch 2014: 
9). This is indispensable to raise the resources and manpower required to stand up to and 
defend against its militarily superior adversaries (Jentzsch 2014). 
Externally, they have to balance two different strategies, deterrence and the search for 
patronage. On one hand, self-defense militias must above all appear able to defend themselves 
against both predation and attacks by any of the main warring parties or other VNSA 
(Schuberth 2015: 302-303). On the other hand, small, insufficiently armed bands of ragtag 
civilians, without access to the economic enterprises of warlords or the far-reaching networks 
of traditional militias, require an external patron of some kind in the long run (Jentzsch 2014: 
23). Hence, self-defense militias have to search for support from other actors. Considering 
this will normally be the most affluent actor in a civil war, and self-defense militias’ 
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conservative inclination “to protect what they have rather than demand social change” 
(Jentzsch 2014: 26), this patron will most likely be the government (ibid.). 
 
7. Tactical Boon, Strategic Burden? Militias as Indigenous Forces 
 
With the strategic profiles of the militias in place, their respective impact as IF and their 
interaction with the requirements of the different strategic levels of the COIN campaign can 
now be assessed. 
In the case of traditional militias, their tactics, combining extensive local knowledge 
with unconventional maneuvers and formations, offer valuable skills for the COIN effort by 
allowing for the pursuit of insurgents in difficult physical and cultural terrains. Whether with 
their own units or together with counterinsurgent forces, traditional militias can thereby 
directly contribute to the COIN’s ability to locate and eliminate insurgents. In addition, the 
gathering of intelligence within the traditional militia’s socio-cultural unit will be highly 
facilitated by including them as IF. This connection to their respective community also makes 
them both adept at and willing to engage in defensive operations aimed at securing civilian or 
military sites in the settlements under their aegis. 
Their unconventional tactics and loose organizational structure, however, may impair 
their ability to integrate fully into counterinsurgents’ conventional forces and their fixed 
chains-of-command. Furthermore, due to the brutal tactics they have been known to use, 
traditional militias may also have difficulties adhering to counterinsurgents’ rules of 
engagement (cf. Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 18). 
Operationally, traditional militias’ extensive information networks, accessible 
wherever significant concentrations of their socio-cultural unit reside, can offer actionable 
intelligence to the COIN planning process beyond the immediate tactical context. Apart from 
geographical layouts, cultural and language specifics, and potential insurgent targets, this also 
includes insights on regional power dynamics between similar parochial actors. 
These networks also facilitate counterinsurgents’ control of the population and their 
ability to monitor potential insurgent collaborators effectively, especially within the 
community of the traditional militia. This increased local presence further facilitates the 
defense of liberated areas and encouraging friendly cooperation with the COIN by reducing 
the potential for insurgent reprisals. The effectiveness of clan-based militias used by the 
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Russian COIN in Chechnya at preventing renewed insurgent violence in the villages they’ve 
been deployed in has been widely acknowledged (Lyall 2010; Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015, 
2016). 
Because of their focus on the well-being of their own constituency, however, traditional 
militias may be reluctant to contribute to operations in territory where their community has no 
significant population or which interfere with their constituency’s parochial or economic 
interests. Traditional militias may also have little incentive, or permission, to protect those 
parts of the community who are not part of their in-group. When their presence threatened 
Shia militias’ business interests in the Iraqi city of Basra, for example, they turned against the 
British counterinsurgents, forcing them to retreat from the city (Hughes 2010: 162-163).  
The strategic utility of including traditional militias depends highly on the local socio-
cultural context, and more specifically on the degree of heterogeneity within a specific 
theatre. 
Ideally, including traditional militias grants a COIN campaign a large deal of local 
legitimacy by complementing the military authority of the foreign counterinsurgent with the 
traditional one of the time-honored institutions they’re built on. This perceived continuity also 
facilitates the creation of stable local institutions, as the preexisting traditional governance 
structures, however minimal they may be, can be bolstered with counterinsurgent resources 
and expertise and transitioned into formal institutions. Turning again to Iraq, following the 
‘de-Ba’athification’ of the Iraqi state, the Shia militias and commanders favored by the US 
counterinsurgents were coopted, along with their extensive patronage and kinship networks, 
building the backbone of the new state structures (Hughes 2010). 
Traditional militias may also act as an effective channel for the demobilization of 
insurgents. Functioning social networks and receptive traditional institutions facilitate the 
reintegration of former insurgents into civilian life, minimizing the chances of renewed 
defection. Besides weakening insurgents’ military capabilities, this process also undermines 
their own narrative of local legitimacy. For former Chechen insurgents “kinship ties (…) have 
assured membership in the newly formed armed units” (Souleimanov & Aliyev 2016: 399-
400). 
Traditional militias as IF also contribute to the severing of ties between the local 
population and the insurgents, by forcing the latter to fight a locally legitimate actor with an 
established socio-cultural pedigree. Due to their comprehensive influence on individuals’ 
lives, the existence of traditional institutions also offers an “alternative social ordering (…) 
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[to] the insurgent structure” (Christian 2011: 14) to the agenda of insurgents, especially the 
insurgency, too, defines itself through the traditional cohesion of a particular socio-cultural 
unit. If traditional militias promise the same protection of socio-cultural autonomy, concerned 
individuals may thus be swayed from joining the insurgency. 
However, since truly homogeneous societies are virtually nonexistent (cf. De Vos 
1995: 16), the use of traditional militias can easily “generate a widespread (…) security 
predicament for the whole country” (Felbab-Brown 2016: 271) by altering established 
balances of power. Hence, using traditional militias as IF will likely create a parochial 
struggle between different socio-cultural units, within the larger societal struggle between two 
politico-military units which the COIN is supposed to combat (cf. Hughes 2010). 
These conjectures are supported by the research on tribal militias coopted into the 
Afghan Local Police (ALP) conducted by Felbab-Brown (2016). During her extensive survey 
of different ALP units, she found that in “heterogeneous, polarized, and fractured 
communities, the establishment of ALP units often exacerbates security dilemmas among the 
communities” (Felbab-Brown 2016: 270). 
The added legitimacy within one socio-cultural unit may come at a far-reaching loss of 
it within a rival unit. Institutionalizing traditional patronage networks extended to members of 
one specific socio-cultural unit will likely be rejected by other such groups. Demobilization 
and reintegration of former insurgents might not occur at all, if demobilized fighters from 
different socio-cultural units risk abuses by returning. Finally, members of different socio-
cultural groups previously unsympathetic to their cause may join the insurgency to escape the 
harassment by an emboldened traditional militia into the protection of the insurgents. In Iraq, 
Sunni tribes flocked in scores to the al Qaida-led insurgency, and its successor the Islamic 
State (IS), out of resentment and fear of the abovementioned cooptation of Shia militias who 
abused the local Sunni population (Cockburn 2015: 12).  
Even without the threat of internecine violence, traditional militias and their focus on 
preserving local autonomy will inevitably clash with the degree of centralization necessary to 
construct state institutions. By strengthening these formations materially and granting them 
more formal legitimacy, the unavoidable process of transferring some of this authority in the 
later stages of state-building to the central government will be exacerbated. More critically, 
the vital step of rudimentary “nation-building” (Gentile 2012: 378), which includes a clear 
cultural component, is likely to be opposed by traditional militias, potentially igniting a new 
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insurgency. Speaking of the “hill-tribes” (Kilcullen 2009: 75) of Afghanistan, David Kilcullen 
notes that 
“when threatened by the encroachment of enemies or state authorities on their 
independence (…) [they] stay and fight, banding together to resist intrusion and 
reestablish their independence from external control (…) through violent resistance” 
(Kilcullen 2009: 75-76) 
All of this points to a central strategic dilemma in using traditional militias, namely that their 
foundational dimension is aimed at conserving the sovereignty of their socio-cultural unit 
above all else. Their clientelistic, parochial character is likely to create strategic problems for 
the COIN campaign. By further dividing the population it seeks to control, counterinsurgents 
may also be perceived as biased meddlers in traditional affairs, thereby alienating whole 
groups of people from the institutions they have to create. 
 
Regarding self-defense militias, the tactical level of the COIN can profit chiefly from their 
defensive capabilities and intelligence gathering. For tasks relating to the direct supervision 
and protection of civilian and military targets, such as general police work, reconnaissance 
and intelligence work, establishing and patrolling perimeters and repelling insurgent attacks, 
self-defense militias can draw from their own repertoire of tactics and their intimate 
connection with locals. In addition to these extra ‘boots on the ground’, self-defense militias’ 
intimate social connections also allow counterinsurgents to overcome intelligence and culture-
based obstacles during their operations. 
When it comes to more offensive maneuvers aimed at tracking and eliminating 
insurgents, however, self-defense militias’ eponymous orientation and subpar skills 
disqualifies them from fulfilling active combat roles. In addition, their explicit local focus is 
likely to affect their willingness to engage enemies in operations far removed from their 
native villages. 
Self-defense militias’ utility to the COIN campaign is also limited on an operational 
level. On one hand, they increase counterinsurgents’ physical presence in insurgency-affected 
settlements and, in combination with their access to broad social networks, can significantly 
improve counterinsurgents’ ability to gather intelligence and plan their operations. 
Furthermore, counterinsurgents’ ability to apply selective violence against insurgent 
collaborators and protect informants against reprisals is strengthened. Overall, self-defense 
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militias can contribute to an improved security environment, which facilitates the final stages 
of counterinsurgents’ ‘clear-hold-build’ approach. 
On the other hand, self-defense militias may be infiltrated by insurgent collaborators 
even if the vetting process is performed diligently, leading to critical intelligence leaks and 
attacks on counterinsurgent personnel. The notorious “green-on-blue attacks” (Roggio & 
Lundquist 2016) of Taliban collaborators posing as ALP on Western counterinsurgents 
demonstrate how an insufficient screening process for militias can compromise military 
personnel and operations. 
Moreover, strict geographical limitations also limit their operational value, as the 
intelligence they gather and the military prowess they demonstrate are likely to decrease the 
further the counterinsurgents’ operational planning takes place. 
Finally, the use of self-defense militias as IF also impacts the strategic level of COIN. 
As a true ‘grassroots’ actor tasked exclusively with the provision of security, a public good 
every inhabitant of a town surrounded by war requires, self-defense militias possess a high 
level of local legitimacy. Thus, by employing them as IF, counterinsurgents can build a strong 
feeling of local ownership into the COIN effort and create a more legitimate narrative. 
Furthermore, as self-defense militias and their families are part of the larger community and 
subject to their social control, they are less likely to engage in predatory behavior towards 
civilians, which further boosts their legitimacy. 
This legitimacy, consisting chiefly of apolitical locals concerned only with ensuring the 
safety of their families, also means that insurgents who are forced to attack them forfeit a 
large share of their own legitimacy within the general population. While this is also true for 
traditional militias, self-defense militias’ essentially bipartisan character as well as their local 
embeddedness should further exacerbate this effect. 
The social networks on which self-defense militias are built on also facilitates the 
demobilization of insurgent fighters back into their respective communities, and their 
reintegration into a productive security function. In a similar manner, self-defense militias 
also enable the creation of sustainable local governance structures by using the “innovative 
institutions” (Jentzsch 2014: 266) they establish as a building block for counterinsurgents’ 
state-building efforts, providing both security and economic opportunities to the population. 
In Sierra Leone, self-defense militias were not only integral in the demobilization efforts after 
the country’s civil war, but “were officially recognized and united into the Civilian Defense 
Forces” (ibid.), thereby supplying the first step towards postwar security governance. 
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Self-defense militias’ internal and external security strategies fundamentally align with 
the requirements of COIN campaigns. Internally, their continued local prominence within the 
COIN campaign leaves the responsibility for their safety in their own hands, as opposed to the 
foreign counterinsurgent force, thereby satisfying members’ desire for security, and to provide 
for “the safety of [their] family members and (…) houses” (Koos 2014: 1044), a key desire of 
South Sudanese ‘Arrow Boys’ (ibid.). 
Externally, their search for a patron to support their resistance against the overpowering 
armed groups surrounding them coincides with the designs of the economically powerful 
counterinsurgent. However, self-defense militias still face a dilemma when accepting the 
counterinsurgent’s patronage: While a counterinsurgent’s long-term interest in a partnership is 
far from certain, insurgents may react with violent reprisals against self-defense militias who 
cooperated with the former after the COIN campaign ends. Members of the local ‘Harkis’ 
units in Algeria, for example, were subjected to harsh reprisals by the new Algerian 
government and all but abandoned by the French (Randazzo 2011: 29-33). On the other hand, 
a short-term boost in much-needed resources and expertise may be a safer bet for barely 
equipped self-defense militias than trying to protect themselves from their initial enemies, 
plus a spurned counterinsurgent, on their own. 
All of these strategic considerations, however, depend on the assumption that the self-
defense militia in question has not “gone bad” (Schuberth 2015) that is, has not devolved into 
either a criminal actor or an instrument in local feuds. From the large-scale predation of the 
‘Bakassi Boys’ in Nigeria (Koos 2014: 1043) to the atrocities committed by the South 
Sudanese ‘Arrow Boys’ in neighboring countries (UN 2016: 21-22), self-defense militias 
generally “have a tendency to (…) ‘turn bad’” (Schuberth 2015: 303; Koos 2014: 1048). The 
literature on IF and self-defense militias therefore rightfully stresses that additional control 
mechanisms are indispensable to keep these inclinations in check (Jentzsch 2014; Hughes & 
Tripodi 2009; Gortzak 2009). 
 
As has been shown, both militias suffer from their own distinct drawbacks. Traditional 
militias, while possessing well-tested tactical-operational capabilities and deep-running 
loyalties within their socio-cultural unit, can cause significant problems for the COIN on the 
strategic level. Compared to the capable, if ill-disciplined, forces traditional militias offer to 
counterinsurgents, the inexperienced ad hoc forces of self-defense militias are unlikely to turn 
the military tide of a conflict, even with substantial support from the counterinsurgent. 
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However, self-defense militias’ intrinsic goal of improving local security for their 
whole community, as opposed to traditional militias’ focus on their respective sub-groups, 
makes them natural allies to the COIN campaign. Their shared goals and compatible 
strategies can greatly facilitate cooperation on all levels of strategy, if the counterinsurgent 
recognizes self-defense militias’ local priorities. 
Furthermore, unlike their traditional counterparts who can count on the power of 
traditions to bolster theirs, self-defense militias’ legitimacy is “delivery-based” (Giustozzi 
2009: 14), i.e. depends entirely on their ability to protect their community. This weakness, 
makes them all the more susceptible to counterinsurgents’ control, as self-defense militias 
depend on their continued support to continue resisting the insurgents, who are likely to be 
even more hostile towards them once they pick sides. If the withdrawal of support from the 
counterinsurgent means not only the likely disbanding of the militia, but also violent reprisals 
from surrounding armed groups, acts of rebellion against the counterinsurgent outlined by the 
IF literature are unlikely (cf. Byman 2006). 
It should be noted that warlord militias, as examined in Ikas (2015), suffer from a 
disparity between tactical-operational usefulness and strategic harmfulness similar to 
traditional militias. Just as with traditional militias, the main drawback of using warlord 
militias as IF is that “the strategy and policy goal of the COIN campaign (…) negates the very 
essence of a warlord’s own strategy and economic goal” (Ikas 2015: 7). Although a full 
comparison is beyond the scope of this study, it appears that it is this lack of popular 
legitimacy that ultimately makes warlord militias, out of all militias, the least useful to 
counterinsurgents. 
 
8. Making Strategic Ends Meet – Policy Recommendations  
 
Each subtype of militia presents individual challenges to the counterinsurgent who employs 
them as IF. Based on the requirements of the overall COIN campaign, however, these can be 
addressed, if not solved, on the respective levels of strategy. 
 
Fundamentally, self-defense militias suffer more from tactical and operational problems of 
limited resources and organizational reach than from fundamental strategic issues. At the 
same time, extensive knowledge of, legitimacy within and control over their community make 
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self-defense militias, while perhaps not formidable fighters, still invaluable local allies to the 
COIN effort. This strategic profile generally translates into primarily defensive qualities 
which counterinsurgents should capitalize on (cf. Andres et al 2006: 142). 
To strengthen their defensive capabilities, while also safeguarding against potential 
predatory behavior towards other communities, counterinsurgents should therefore focus on 
supplying self-defense militias primarily armaments designed for defending, instead of 
attacking settlements. Dante Randazzo cites small arms such as “shotguns (…) [with a] short 
range, [which are] better suited for defense (…) [and] pistols (…) [with] limited utility in 
offensive operations because of limited range, caliber, and rate of fire” (Randazzo 2011: 18). 
Locally fixed gunner nests, armored vehicles and security installations such as watchtowers 
and barricades can be safely added to this list of adequate equipment. 
The counterinsurgent should also implement a mixed unit regime or mentoring 
program, with a small contingent of counterinsurgent forces permanently assigned to a 
particular self-defense militia. Not only does this expedite their training, it also boosts the 
subpar tactical leadership skills of the militia’s members in case of an insurgent attack and 
minimizes the chances for predation. An instructive example can be found in the ‘Combined 
Action Platoons’ (CAPs) established by the United States (US) in Vietnam, which “paired up 
a 14-man squad of U.S. Marines with a platoon of 38 locally recruited civilians” (Peic 2014: 
166), which, the US defeat notwithstanding, is “considered to have been highly effective in 
combating the Vietcong insurgency” (ibid.). Similar programs have also been established 
during the British COIN campaign in Malaya and Oman (Jones 2012: 35). 
Counterinsurgents should also account for this defensive strength in their operational 
planning when using self-defense militias. As such, they should be used primarily in 
defensive functions associated with the second and third phase of ‘clear-hold-build’. 
On a strategic level, counterinsurgents have to strike a balance between supplying the 
self-defense militia and keeping it dependent on locals’ support to ensure the militia’s 
behavior is still attuned to locals’ needs and subject to their control. While limiting the 
support given to the militia is both militarily and politically problematic, counterinsurgents 
should use local institutions of governance surrounding the actual militia to channel their aid 
to the self-defense militia. Institutions like the “Sunni Awakening councils” (Clayton & 
Thomson 2014: 924) in Iraq or the “village jirga” (Jones 2012: 30) in Afghanistan should be 
used as vital intermediaries, and should be built on as broad a support base as possible. 
Leaving executive decision power in the hands of these more or less popular-based 
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institutions can prevent the accumulation of too much local power in the hands of the militia 
and their transition into criminality (cf. Schuberth 2015). Impersonal institutions also greatly 
increase counterinsurgents’ ability to sanction individual members of the militia and their 
leaders without risking a breakdown of local structures (cf. Ikas 2015).  
 
Traditional militias, on the other hand, require more strategic than tactical or operational 
adjustments. Geared and trained more towards offensive rather than purely defensive actions, 
their military resources and capabilities can be a great asset for counterinsurgents, if they can 
moderate the militias’ drive for socio-cultural autonomy and their aggressive pursuit of it. 
Counterinsurgents must find a balance between traditional militias’ time-tested tactics, 
that have proven to be particularly effective in their irregular conduct of war, and the formal 
rules of engagement of its own forces. While the added unique ability to “match the enemy’s 
special skills in irregular warfare” (Cassidy 2007: 45) is undoubtedly one of the major 
benefits of using traditional militias, establishing formal hierarchies and mixing 
counterinsurgent with indigenous forces greatly increases units’ cooperation and 
communication skills, and thereby their combat efficacy (Andres et al 2006: 141; Gentile 
2012). More pressingly, formalizing traditional militias’ organization and conduct and pairing 
them with counterinsurgent forces may strengthen military discipline within their ranks and 
help safeguard the rights of noncombatants, especially of those from their socio-cultural out-
groups. 
Counterinsurgents should make sure they retain operational command over traditional 
militias’ activities to prevent them from using their new-found support to advance their own 
parochial goals. Even though this is likely to be met with resistance, (cf. Shultz & Dew 2006: 
49), traditional militias may otherwise aggressively pursue their own strategic goals rather 
than those of the COIN campaign. For similar reasons, counterinsurgents should also abstain 
from deploying traditional militias into territories that lie beyond their original sphere of 
influence to avoid emboldening them further or provoking rival actors. 
The biggest challenge however, lies on the strategic level, where counterinsurgents 
need to overcome traditional militias’ own strategies of protecting their autonomy. Two 
approaches are generally conceivable: 
First, counterinsurgents can sponsor, or set up, additional militias from different socio-
cultural units, thereby creating a counterweight to a particularly assertive traditional militia 
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and reaffirming other socio-cultural groups’ rights vis-à-vis a dominant one. Alternatively, by 
diluting its membership boundaries and tradition-based institutions while keeping the purely 
administrative ones, the traditional militia may be slowly transformed it into a ‘disinterested’ 
self-defense militia.  Both of these possible strategic adaptations by counterinsurgents have 
obvious flaws. Militarizing even more socio-cultural groups and increasing their demands for 
autonomy, or weakening militias’ social cohesion and eroding their ability to draw from their 
established networks can both produce adverse results, effectively reducing local security 
instead of increasing it. This reflects both the inherent difficulties of overcoming traditional 
militias’ own strategy as well as the gravity of its foundational dimension. 
 
9. Conclusion  
 
While necessarily limited in its depth, this explorative survey has shown that significant 
differences exist between militias’ strategic profiles, and that these differences have 
significant consequences for their effectiveness as IF on the respective strategy levels of the 
COIN campaign. Traditional militias, while useful for conducting irregular warfare against 
mobile insurgents and pacifying specific segments of the native population, are socially 
divisive entities and as such entail a host of strategic issues for counterinsurgents wishing to 
employ them. On the other hand, self-defense militias’ inherent military weakness requires 
counterinsurgents to confine their use to defensive operations, but their broad local support 
can be translated into strengthening newly built institutions that are central to the success of 
the COIN. The strategic model used in this study, while methodologically ‘weaker’ than 
studies sporting more elaborate frameworks or case studies, has nonetheless proven adept at 
showing how breaking militias’ behavior down into the three levels of strategy can provide a 
more nuanced picture of their potential as IF. 
For the academic community, this study emphasizes the need to engage the topic of 
VNSA with due attention to detail instead of clinging to simplistic notions of actors that fail 
to account for the empirical variety of the actors dominating the ‘new wars’ of today. Even 
the typology offered here may very well be criticized as being overly generalizing and 
deterministic, as it necessarily fails to neatly capture every empirical militia in its abstract 
categories. Pinning down a particular group on a single fundamental motivation can prove 
difficult in practice, as hybrid groups make such clear-cut analytical categories hard to apply. 
For example, can the ‘Arbakai’ militias in Afghanistan, that are established for self-defense, 
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but built with specific reference to traditions and tribal allegiance (Felbab-Brown 2016), be 
easily categorized as self-defense militias without neglecting an important part of their 
organizational ‘essence’? 
Future research on militias should investigate how these hybrid groups come into being 
and how their conflicting goals are reflected in their behavior: why does this evolution take 
place? Does it have to be exclusively economically motivated, as Schuberth (2015) seems to 
suggest, or can formerly economically motivated militias also ‘turn good’, i.e. orient 
themselves more towards addressing public grievances? And how can counterinsurgents take 
advantage of a refocus of a militia’s strategic goals? In the recently blooming intersection of 
research on VNSA, COIN, and IF, these and other questions can guide scholars in their future 
inquiries into the nature of militias and their potential to contribute to restoring peace in 
embattled societies. 
The policy recommendations, while aimed at countering some of the militias’ 
weaknesses, further accentuate the fundamental short- and long-term issues surrounding the 
use of IF by counterinsurgents. Even if their tendencies to ‘go bad’ can be countered through 
innovative control mechanisms, and their military weakness compensated through extensive 
support; IF remain at best a costly asset, a risky bet, and bad company. 
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